Introduction
The global economic downturn will force a reduction in the Department of Defense budget. The U.S. military, however, will stay globally engaged. The Department of Defense will experience budget cuts while sustaining global engagements ranging from security cooperation exercises to humanitarian relief to war. 2 The Army will require the participation of its reserve components to sustain the required global engagement. Therefore, the ARNG will remain an operational force in an era of reduced defense budgets. The challenge the ARNG will face over the next several years will be to select strategies to prepare the ARNG for operational employment in an era of reduced resources. Every budget reduction carries with it some degree of operational risk. The ARNG should select strategies that mitigate risk where possible, and accept the lowest possible risk to mission and soldier welfare when necessary. The greatest risk of all would be to ignore these hard decisions. Such a course of action constitutes a failure to plan. Such a course of action would result in hasty and poorly coordinated decisions, and ultimately shift the burden of risk to the soldiers sent into harm's way. The ARNG must plan to sustain itself as an operational reserve in an era of declining resources. This paper will begin by defining operational force, and the strategy to achieve that status with the Army National Guard. This paper will then discuss assumptions about the future of the ARNG budget between FY 2011 and FY 2017, as well as the anticipated operating environment and subsequent demand on Army National Guard forces. Finally, this paper will discuss strategies that the ARNG could adopt to sustain an operational capability in an era of reduced resources. The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services' force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units or individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed. The capabilities needed by the ARNG to accomplish the various state missions do not directly correlate to the warfighting capabilities needed by ARNG units to accomplish their federal mission. However, the demand for units overseas did create, for a time,
concern by some governors that the ARNG did not always have enough capability under state control to accomplish state missions. In July 2005 the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, LTG Blum, committed to the National Governors Association that the National Guard would strive to ensure that no more than 50% of any state national guard would be deployed and unavailable to the state governor at any given time. 12 Training Center like exercise, which provides the capstone event to achieve company level proficiency.
The cost to fund the extra training days, and the tank and wheeled vehicle OPTEMPO miles to fund the CATS derived training events, comes to an additional $481 million dollars per year. 16 This is over and above the cost of the pre-ARFORGEN platoon proficiency training model. This cost is ultimately driven by the Army's desire to maximize BOG conflicting with Secretary of Defense' desire to limit mobilization time.
Prolonged Demand for an Operational Reserve
The Army will require ARNG forces to participate in the operational force for the foreseeable future. Not only will overseas contingency operations will continue to demand ARNG forces, but the various combatant commanders want authority to require ARNG forces to execute their theater engagement plans and support to theater engagement plans. The most comprehensive recent study on the role of reserve forces, the Commission of the National Guard and Reserves, came to this conclusion in its final report.
Given the threats that the United States faces at home and abroad, the looming fiscal challenges the nation confronts, the projected demand for forces, the unique capabilities resident in the reserve components, and their cost effectiveness, the Commission sees no reasonable alternative to an increased use of and reliance on the reserve components. This conclusion is not dependent on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq…. 17 The Army's long term strategy to continuously provide adequate forces to sustain both overseas contingency operations and global engagement requires forces generated as depicted in figure 4 below. providing enabling capabilities, will still need the costs associated with building company level proficiency. There will be a small degree of strategic risk incurred, as it will take 30 days longer to prepare CEF units for emerging contingencies. To enable the use of CEF units as required, the Army should consider requesting relief from the 12 month mobilization cap for CEF units, or plan to achieve eight months of BOG with CEF units.
Either course of action has acceptable risk. Since a CEF unit is a contingency force, it is not planned for recurring mobilization; it is just prepared for mobilization if required.
Therefore, it is not necessary to protect recurring access with the 12 month mobilization cap. If the 12 month mobilization cap will not be lifted, then a CEF could still respond to a contingency. The deployed unit will either resolve the contingency or give the Army eight months to plan a strategy to meet the new recurring requirement (which could include elevating future CEFs to DEF status, thereby achieving company proficiency and staying with the 12 month mobilization cap). CEF units used for theater engagements will be employed for extended training periods, possibly up to 60 days.
Therefore, their OPTEMO will still be below that required to protect recurring access.
Cost savings with this strategy include the majority of the training budget to bring the Army National Guard from its current level of 65% equipping to 90% equipped by 2019. 26 The will greatly reduce, but not eliminate, the need to practice horizontal equipping. In a resource constrained environment, it may be the least worse choice to reduce or extend the equipment buy in order to preserve other resources more vital to readiness. ARFORGEN driven training and availability equipping requirements rise as the echelon of collective training rises through the ARFORGEN cycle (refer to figure 3).
Units achieve Individual, Crew, and Squad (I/C/S) proficiency in ARFORGEN years 1-3.
The historic 65% equipping level is sufficient to achieve this, as past performance demonstrates. Units achieve platoon proficiency in year four, followed by company Since funding the FTM program to 100% of the current requirement will cost roughly $2 billion a year (see Figure 6 ), funding the FTM requirement at 70% will save roughly $600 million a year. Since funding the additional 30% FTEs would be based on specific wartime requirements, this cost can be pushed out of the base budget and into
Overseas Contingency Operations funding. This -pay as you go‖ strategy will not save money if demand remains at or beyond sustainable capacity. However, as demand falls, as indicated in figures 4 and 5, costs will fall with it.
Conclusion
The ARNG is likely to be faced with the problem of sustaining an operational force capability with a much smaller budget. Budget reductions during wartime present leadership choices that range from bad to least bad. The ARNG leadership will not get the luxury of a -good‖ choice. The ARNG strategy to navigate this operational environment should consider where it can assume risk to maintain an operational force capability. It is under these conditions that the ARNG leadership may consider the -least bad‖ recommendations that follow.
The ARNG leadership could consider accepting risk in three areas. The ARNG could assume risk in reduced readiness for CEF units, requiring 90 days of postmobilization training instead of the current 60 training period. The course of action carries a strategic risk, as it increases the time required to respond to any contingency. These cost savings may carry hidden long term costs, and bring additional risks that range from the strategic to the tactical. Therefore, this paper merely serves as the springboard for additional thought and study. What is certain is that our soldiers and our nation deserve leadership that does not shy from hard choices. The current economic environment cannot fail to affect public budgets. The nature of our current wars requires long term commitments from the U.S. military. The only sure path to success lies in facing difficult choices with courage and leadership.
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